Relitigating Life and Death by Dresser, Rebecca
Relitigating Life and Death
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In recent articles, both Nancy Rhoden' and I' criticize the "subtly dishon-
est ' 3 legal standards governing life and death decisionmaking for incompetent
patients. Both of us argue for replacing the current standards with ones that
more accurately reflect the dynamics of such decisionmaking. At this point,
however, we part ways. Rhoden endorses the use of living wills, the patient's
prior values and preferences, and family discretion to resolve treatment ques-
tions. In this Article, I take issue with her position on the ground that it insuffi-
ciently meets our moral obligation to protect incompetent patients.
Part I is a summary of Rhoden's Article. In Part II, I contest her claim
that an objective treatment standard dehumanizes patients,4 and contend in-
stead that such a standard demonstrates the highest regard for these individu-
als. I also point out that Rhoden's suggested "reasonableness" test itself incor-
porates an objective standard. Part III addresses the merits of Rhoden's
argument that living wills should invariably govern subsequent treatment deci-
sions. Her position must be recognized as subordinating the welfare of incompe-
tent patients to the desires of competent persons to have future control. Part IV
analyzes Rhoden's proposal for family discretion in treatment decisionmaking.
In it, I express doubts about the proposal's ability to protect patients from inap-
propriate treatment decisions. I conclude by calling on courts to adopt an objec-
tive treatment standard that acknowledges the moral relevance of quality-of-life
judgments, family preferences, and other external considerations in treatment
decisionmaking.
I. RHODEN'S POSITION
Rhoden begins by criticizing the courts' overly expansive application of a
subjective treatment standard that purports to implement the incompetent pa-
tient's "right" of self-determination.5 According to this standard, nontreatment
is acceptable if there is evidence demonstrating that the patient when competent
would have chosen this outcome. The freedom to choose life-sustaining treat-
ment is part of the competent patient's right of self-determination. Rhoden
shows, however, that it is frequently misleading to adopt this analysis in cases
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involving incompetent patients, because there is no patient choice to imple-
ment.' Unless the patient previously issued an explicit treatment directive, such
as a living will, Rhoden argues against analyzing treatment decisions in terms
of the patient's right to decide." Instead, courts should acknowledge that a pa-
tient's prior informal statements, medical practices, and religious beliefs can
supply only a weak indication of what the patient would choose. In reality,
Rhoden argues, proxy decisionmakers are inevitably influenced by their own in-
terests and values, as well as their subjective interpretations of what the patient
would want." Except when an explicit treatment directive exists, Rhoden con-
cludes that courts demand the impossible when they require clear and convinc-
ing evidence that incompetent patients would refuse treatment if they were
competent.9
Having rejected the courts' subjective standard as largely unattainable,
Rhoden proceeds to argue that a purely objective standard is an inadequate
substitute. l0 Objective standards resolve treatment dilemmas based on an as-
sessment of the benefits and burdens a proposed medical intervention would
confer on the incompetent patient. Because the patient is no longer able to
make a competent choice based on that individual's subjective values and pref-
erences, treatment decisions are to embody observers' best judgments on what
outcome would be most solicitous of the patient's present interests.,,
According to Rhoden, an objective treatment standard dehumanizes pa-
tients by treating them as mere repositories of sensations and deprives incompe-
tent patients of their past12 by failing to consider the desires, intentions, and
values they held as competent individuals. For Rhoden, conceiving of these pa-
tients as having radically different interests than they once had, or as in some
sense being different persons, has morally objectionable consequences. The bet-
ter course, in her view, is to incorporate into the legal standard the ordinary
"notion that a person is one person, and one person only, from birth through old
age, despite whatever changes and vicissitudes she might undergo." 3 Thus,
when a living will exists, it should determine the treatment outcome; in other
cases, courts should allow proxy decisionmakers to consider the incompetent pa-
tient's less formally expressed values and preferences, but acknowledge that this
is not the same as determining precisely what the patient would choose.
To compensate for the medical profession's tendency to be overly liberal
with its life-sustaining interventions, Rhoden proposes the creation of a legal
presumption favoring the treatment choice of the patient's close relative.' 4 Fam-
ilies should be advised to consider the patient's prognosis, existing pain and
pleasure, and former values. The decision ideally would mirror what the patient
6. Id. at 377, 385-89.
7. Id. at 381-82, 385-94.
8. See id. at 390-94.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 396-419.
11. Id. at 409.
12. Id. at 396.
13. Id. at 414.
14. Id. at 437-39.
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would have wanted, although Rhoden cautions that the relative's own views and
values are unavoidable influences as well.1 5 She suggests that the presumption
be implemented by changing the current system in which families must seek
judicial authorization for nontreatment when physicians refuse to comply with
the family's wishes. Instead, physicians wishing to override a family's nontreat-
ment decision should have the burden of going to court to demonstrate that the
family's decision is unreasonable.' 6 According to Rhoden, courts should deem a
nontreatment decision unreasonable and hence, legally impermissible, if the pa-
tient "retains any capacity to experience and enjoy life.""
II. THE CASE FOR A MODIFIED OBJECTIVE STANDARD
Rhoden claims to oppose a present-oriented objective standard because it
dehumanizes patients, treats them as "sensation receptacles,"' 8 and unjustifi-
ably undermines living wills. I disagree. In reality, it is the objective standard
that can demonstrate moral respect for incompetent patients by ensuring their
continued care when they have significant interests in living. It can also protect
them from harmful treatment decisions they issued when they were competent.
Finally, the objective standard has the added virtue of delineating an appropri-
ate role for other interested parties, including the patient's family, to play in
resolving treatment dilemmas.
As her models for the objective standard, Rhoden discusses the objective
tests set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy.'9 In these
tests, physical pain and suffering are weighed against any physical pleasure,
emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that treatment and continued
life would provide the incompetent patient.20 Nontreatment is permitted only
when the patient's pain and suffering clearly outweigh the benefits that can be
obtained from treatment.2 '
The problem here is not with objective standards in general, but with this
specific objective test. According to Conroy, treatment is required as long as the
patient's pain and suffering remain less than severe, even if little or no positive
benefit is present. Rhoden rightly criticizes the Conroy standard as providing
little guidance regarding the permanently unconscious patient, and conveying
an impoverished view of human existence when it is applied to conscious incom-
petent patients. 2 ' She is convinced that a better approach is to decide these
cases by referring, whenever possible, to these patients' former competent values
15. See id. at 438-41.
16. Id. at 440-41.
17. Id. at 437.
18. Id. at 409.
19. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 396-419.
20. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
21. According to the "limited-objective" test, life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn when "some
trustworthy evidence" exists that the patient would have refused treatment and it is "clear that the burdens of the
patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life." Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. The
"pure-objective" test allows treatment to be foregone in the absence of trustworthy evidence that the patient
would have refused treatment. In these cases, the burdens of continued life with treatment must so "clearly and
markedly" outweigh the benefits that it would be "inhumane" to treat. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
22. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 396-410.
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and preferences, realizing that this will not necessarily be the same as determin-
ing what the patients would choose.2 3 But I believe that a more defensible solu-
tion lies in adopting a refined objective standard to govern these cases, and in-
deed, Rhoden proposes just such a test in the final pages of her Article. 4
An objective treatment standard weighs the features of life that reasonably
qualify as benefits or burdens for all human beings. Severe, unremediable pain
is a relatively uncontroversial example of something all but the rare individual
would experience as a heavy burden.25 Conroy includes as objective benefits
physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, and intellectual satisfaction, all of
which presuppose some level of cognitive awareness. 6 What the Conroy test
omits is that even in the absence of pain, life without such cognitive awareness
can be of no real value to a patient.
As Rhoden points out, objective tests are inherently imprecise, given that
particular individuals will differ in the values they assign to various exper-
iences.27 The accuracy with which objective tests can be applied is also limited
by the uncertainty that always accompanies one person's judgments about what
another is experiencing.28 But Rhoden concedes that observers can perform such
evaluations to decide, for example, that life-sustaining treatment is appropriate
for a moderately retarded person who interacts with the surrounding environ-
ment to obtain physical, emotional, and some intellectual satisfaction.29 She
claims to be against adopting such an analysis as a general means of determin-
ing when treatment is required for incompetent patients, however. 30
I contend that a modified objective standard supplies the most satisfactory
means of deciding whether incompetent patients should be treated. Conroy's
standard is too narrow, for it fails to allow nontreatment of the permanently
unconscious and barely conscious patient not in severe pain, yet obtaining virtu-
ally no benefit from continued life. The permanently unconscious patient has no
ability to experience life. Similarly, if the most a patient can experience is phys-
ical sensation, then the person can gain none of the goods that make human life
valuable to an individual.2" At minimum, some capacity for social interaction is
23. Id. at 415-16.
24. See id. at 437-45.
25. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 392 & n.107.
26. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-67, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
27. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 398-99.
28. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 390-91. Indeed, this also limits our understanding of competent persons
who are able to speak. We can never be completely certain that even the competent patient refusing treatment is
truly motivated by a proclaimed preference for comfort and dignity, as opposed to some other unspoken influence
such as a need for gaining a sense of control or the attention of others. See generally, R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF
STRANGERS (1979) (explains effect of difficulties of assessing patients' needs on rule of law in doctor-patient
relations in right to die context).
29. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 399.
30. Id. at 398-410.
31. These patients do have a very small positive interest in being maintained, based on two remote possibili-
ties: physician error in the diagnosis of a permanent condition or discovery of a cure in the near future. See
PRESIDENT'S COIMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 182-83 (1983). Barely conscious patients
also have interests in avoiding negative physical sensations and obtaining positive ones. Dresser, supra note 2, at
384. These interests, however, are insufficient to make continued life a significant benefit to these individuals. See
infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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a prerequisite to meaningful existence. Without it, treatment and continued life
cannot confer a morally significant benefit on the incompetent patient. Thus, the
objective standard should permit nontreatment when the patient lacks any rela-
tional capacity.3 2 Conversely, the standard should mandate treatment that will
enable the patient capable of interacting with the environment to continue life,
as long as significant pain and discomfort are absent. 33
This is essentially what Rhoden's concluding reasonableness standard
achieves. The incompetent patient with "some level of awareness" who "can
interact with her environment in some way-even if she is completely nonver-
bal" should be treated even against her family's wishes, because she has a
strong present interest in continued life.3 In contrast, the permanently uncon-
scious patient need not be treated, because "if a patient cannot experience her
life at all, then those qualities and capacities that make her human are irre-
trievably lost. . .. ,,35 Similarly, the ability to experience physical sensations
alone fails to confer on patients a significant interest in being treated. Some
increased capacity to relate to the environment is the minimum necessary to
justify continued treatment, as Rhoden has argued elsewhere.36
Contrary to Rhoden's ostensible rejection of objective standards, it is sim-
ply impossible to apply her reasonableness test without engaging in an objective
assessment of the incompetent patient's current capacities and interests. More-
over, in describing her reasonableness test, Rhoden fails to stipulate that a pa-
tient with relational capacity must be treated solely when this is consistent with
that patient's prior competent values and preferences. This indicates that
Rhoden believes, and in my view rightly so, that all such incompetent patients
should be treated, based on their present capacities and experiences alone.
As Rhoden's reasonableness test illustrates, observers can make acceptable,
albeit inevitably imprecise, decisions on when an incompetent patient currently
has interests mandating treatment. The point is that even someone critical of an
objective standard is in the end unavoidably drawn to it. The evaluation simply
should be expanded beyond the Conroy test to incorporate the additional rela-
tional capacity that members of our society generally view as minimally neces-
sary for meaningful human existence.37 Contrary to Conroy, it is not simply
32. See Arras, Toward an Ethic of Ambiguity, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. at 25, 31-32 (Apr. 1984). This
criterion is admittedly general, and will demand more precise definition as it is applied in individual cases. In
addition, in some cases it will be unclear whether a patient is capable of interacting with the envirpnment. In my
view, however, the relational capacity criterion offers the most promising approach to determining when incompe-
tent patients have morally significant interests in continued life.
33. See Dresser & Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A
Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 240-41 (1989).
34. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 442. Rhoden notes, and I agree, that the standard should allow nontreatment
in such cases if the proposed medical intervention would confer substantial burdens such as pain or invasiveness,
or continued life would entail unremediable pain. Id. at 442-44.
35. Id. at 442.
36. See Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1283, 1318-23 (1985).
37. Some would deem this capacity necessary to "personhood." See, e.g., T. ENGELHARDT, FOUNDATIONS
OF BIOETHICS 104-10 (1986); Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 277, 283-84 (1988). If incompetent individuals who lack relational capacity are no longer persons, we may
not owe them the same degree of respect we owe to persons. Thus, their interests in obtaining treatment could be
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
absence of pain that gives a person a significant interest in continued life; some
ability to interact with the environment is necessary as well. Such an enriched
objective standard can take into account the absence of "human cognition, love,
and awareness" that Rhoden suggests was the true source of everyone's desire
to stop Claire Conroy's treatment. 38
It is quite true that standards defining treatment obligations according to
considerations such as relational capacity and physical sensations incorporate
quality-of-life judgments .3  To apply such standards to determine which combi-
nations of benefits and burdens necessitate a patient's treatment, deci-
sionmakers must reflect on what constitutes a life worth living for the patient.
As Rhoden and others have argued before me, although quality-of-life judg-
ments are not without their dangers, they can be a morally acceptable basis for
treatment decisions. 40 The relevant question is not whether a "normal" healthy
person would find life worth living in the incompetent patient's condition. It is
instead whether the patient, who cannot experience life in its usual complexity
and abundance, still has experiences that make continued life from that person's
point of view better than no life at all.4 Indeed, this is exactly what the courts
in Conroy and other cases have struggled to determine, all the while proclaim-
ing their contempt for quality-of-life judgments.4' According to Rhoden's rea-
sonableness and my modified objective standards, patients must have some abil-
ity to relate to their environments for life to hold value for them.
Finally, contrary to Rhoden's contentions, a present-oriented objective
standard is far from dehumanizing. Although the features included in an objec-
tive assessment are "person-neutral" 43 in that they would constitute benefits and
burdens to most people, the assessment itself centers on the individual patient
and is in this sense highly subjective. The test attempts to determine what life is
like for this patient, based on observable data such as behavior, appearance,
and response to medical and psychological tests.44 The genuine moral implica-
more easily subordinated to the interests of others, such as their relatives' financial and emotional burdens. See id.
at 287.
38. Rhoden, supra note I, at 406.
39. Rhoden's reasonableness standard is based on such judgments.
40. See Rhoden, supra note 36, at 1318-23 (quality-of-life assessment focusing on handicapped newborn's
potential for human interaction sufficiently protects child's interest in life with meaning and value). See also
Quinn, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard
for Decisionmaking, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 897, 926-33 (1988)(endorsing relational capacity standard).
Alan Buchanan and Dan Brock point out that a patient-centered best interest standard must take into ac-
count quality-of-life judgments. Buchanan & Brock, Deciding for Others, 64 MILBANK Q. 17, 73 (Supp. 11 1986).
In their asserted rejections of quality-of-life considerations in treatment decisionmaking, courts have confused two
variations of the concept. They have assumed that quality-of-life judgments necessarily depend on how society
would value a particular incompetent patient's life as it compares with the lives of other more functional individu-
als. But quality-of-life assessments need not incorporate such interpersonal social worth evaluations. Instead, they
can be intrapersonal and ask what value life holds for that individual. Id. at 74. By taking this approach, the law
can maintain its commitment to protect incompetent patients from harm. See Quinn, supra, at 926-33 (relational
capacity standard promotes sanctity of life in meaningful sense and excludes social worth considerations).
41. See Arras, supra note 32, at 30 (best interest test requires asking not whether a normal adult would
rather die than live life with infant's disabilities, but whether a child who has never had normal goals and exper-
iences would prefer death to the life the child has).
42. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 387 n.57.
43. Id. at 399 n.102.
44. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 390-93.
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tion of divorcing incompetent patients from their past values and prefer-
ences-which are now meaningless to them-is that they are important to us in
their current state, even though they lack their former "normal" abilities.'5 By
adopting a present-oriented objective standard, the law can declare that the in-
competent patient is still someone, an individual who merits our concern despite
her current lack of appreciation of the "higher-order" desires and ideas she
once had.
III. THE LIVING WILL'S HIDDEN MORAL IMPLICATIONS
The modified objective standard demonstrates respect for incompetent pa-
tients by respecting what matters to them in their incompetent state. This re-
spect should be maintained in every case. Thus, even if treatment preferences
are explicitly stated in a living will, the incompetent patient's former competent
preferences should be subordinate to the patient's present well-being. A major
source of Rhoden's opposition to an objective standard is the threat this stan-
dard poses to the living will. 6 She is entirely correct that the objective test
endangers the validity of advance treatment directives, since the standard fo-
cuses on what currently concerns the patient, as opposed to what formerly was
important. Yet instead of labeling this an objectionable by-product of the objec-
tive standard, I welcome the assault on the living will. Indeed, this challenge
most clearly conveys the moral costs of allowing a patient's former beliefs and
values to control treatment decisionmaking.
There are at least two ways to think about why an incompetent patient's
former explicit treatment wishes should be subordinate. One approach accepts
Rhoden's view that a human being should be considered one person throughout
life.' 7 The approach acknowledges, however, that persons can also have widely
varied needs, concerns, and interests over the course of their lives, as they expe-
rience different stages of development and decline. For competent healthy
adults, a life worth living usually consists of work, family relationships, friend-
ships, hobbies, and similar pleasures and challenges. A competent patient forced
to choose between a drastically restricted life and a comfortable death might
prefer death over the compromised existence. But when people become incom-
petent and debilitated, they lose touch with their past concerns, and the re-
stricted life that once seemed demeaning can instead be of value to them .'
In general, competent persons retain the ability to alter important personal
choices to protect their changing interests over time, as long as the interests of
45. Rhoden correctly asserts that it makes no sense to attribute autonomy rights to patients who have been
incompetent their whole lives. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 386, 388. But I find incomprehensible her argument that
we should attribute to incompetent patients interests and values that can no longer have meaning for them. Id. at
414-15, 418-19. Although reading the New York Times is now an activity I seek out and enjoy each day, if I
become incompetent and lose the ability to read, it would be absurd for someone to bring me the daily paper on
grounds that this shows respect for my life in its "larger context."
46. See id. at 410-16.
47. Id. at 378, 414-19.
48. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 33, at 236-37.
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other involved parties can also be adequately accommodated."9 But if living
wills contain binding treatment decisions, incompetent patients lose such protec-
tion. This can occur because honoring the living will rules out any reconsidera-
tion of the earlier choice, even though that choice may be detrimental to the
patient's current interests.
Derek Parfit and other philosophers offer an alternative conceptual ap-
proach to these cases.50 In analyzing the meaning of personal identity, they ar-
gue that an individual whose psychological features-beliefs, desires, memories,
and intentions-change radically can become a new "self." According to this
analysis, the former treatment choices expressed in a living will could be those
of another person, not the presently incompetent patient." If so, the former
choices should have no particular bearing on the existing individual's
treatment.
52
Rhoden rejects the argument that persons, or at least their interests, may
change so dramatically over time that former choices should not determine pre-
sent outcomes. For her, the incompetent patient is more properly seen as "a
person who has become demented,"'" whose past concerns continue in some
sense, rather than as the debilitated person the patient is now. As her primary
support for this position, Rhoden claims that people who issue living wills, as
well as those whose competent preferences remain less formally articulated, do
not want in the future to be regarded as different persons, or as people with
interests unconnected to their prior history, values, and so forth., Although this
is probably true, it does not necessarily follow that what competent people want
49. See Rhoden, supra note I, at 411-12. See also Dresser & Robertson, supra note 33, at 237 (distinguish-
ing legally binding prior choices from living wills).
50. See, e.g., D. PARFiT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199-347 (1984); J. PERRY, The Problem of Personal Iden-
tity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 3 (J. Perry ed. 1975) (summarizing theories of personal identity).
51. Dresser, supra note 2, at 380-81.
52. Rhoden, I think, conveys a misimpression of the effect Parfit's view would have on our social and institu-
tional relationships. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 414-15. In analyzing what makes an individual at two points in
time the same person, Parfit points to psychological "connectedness" (direct memory and other direct psychologi-
cal connections) arid "continuity" (overlapping chains of strong psychological connections) between the two times.
D. PARFIT, supra note 50, at 205-06. Strong connectedness exists when the "number of connections, over any day,
is at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual
person." Id. at 206. In this framework, an individual is the same person 20 years later if psychological continuity
exists. It is not necessary that the individual have the same psychological features between day one and 20 years
later; it is enough if strong connectedness existed over the days that elapsed during that time. Id. at 206-07.
Although he offers a suggestion in his definition of strong connectedness, Parfit refuses to take a definite
stance on exactly how much connectedness and continuity are necessary to maintain one's personal identity over
time. Id. at 206 & n.6. Even in the Russian landowner case Rhoden describes, Parfit merely asserts that it would
be "plausible" for the wife to regard the landowner as a different self. Id. at 327. The frequency with which
individuals become different persons depends on how much psychological connectedness and continuity is
"enough." See Buchanan, supra note 37, at 283-94. Frequent changes in personal identity would occur over time
only if a very high degree of connectedness and continuity were required. See id. at 292 (Parfit's "view is simply
neutral as to what degree of psychological continuity is required for the persistence of the person."). Otherwise,
most persons would remain the same persons over the course of their lives. Acceptance of Parfit's theory as a
helpful means of analyzing how individuals change over time need not have the drastic effect Rhoden suggests. In
some cases, however, the advent of incompetency could so severely reduce psychological connectedness and con-
tinuity that we could properly regard the patient as a different person. See T. ENGELHARDT, supra note 37, at
126-27 (severe brain damage might provide basis for finding former person no longer exists).
53. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 415.
54. Id. at 418.
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should determine the legal treatment standard. The justifications for this posi-
tion merit closer scrutiny than Rhoden gives them. It is not surprising that com-
petent persons tend to favor having control over how they are perceived and
treated as incompetent patients. But if the law is to express equal respect for
incompetent individuals, despite their compromised mental and physical condi-
tion, the competent person should be denied absolute control. In my view, future
control should not extend to harming incompetent patients who retain signifi-
cant interests in continued life.
To claim that living wills should determine the incompetent patient's treat-
ment is to affirm the authority of competent persons to control their own fu-
tures. Just as people may wish to purchase health insurance to pay for their
subsequent care, they may also wish to ensure that they are not kept alive in a
condition they now see as "degrading and without human dignity" and burden-
some to their loved ones.55 Making a living will to this effect gives competent
people peace of mind and helps them feel more comfortable about growing old.
Suppose, however, that such a person becomes physically and cognitively
impaired from a stroke. Several months later, she gets pneumonia. Her living
will clearly directs that antibiotic treatment should be withheld. If the pneumo-
nia is treated, however, she can return to a highly restricted-but enjoyable to
her-existence of watching television and eating meals with her acquaintances
in the nursing home.56 By honoring this patient's living will, the law elevates the
interests of the competent person in controlling her future care above the wel-
fare of an incompetent patient who retains material interests in continued life.
Conversely, applying the objective standard to this case announces that the in-
competent patient deserves protection from a harmful treatment decision, even
though she herself once approved such a decision.
Rhoden neglects to mention that living wills can also produce detrimental
decisions to treat incompetent patients. Take the committed vitalist who in-
structs that she should be treated as long as there is any physiological activity in
her body. Later she becomes terminally ill, experiences severe, unremediable
pain and distress and, although conscious, is incompetent and cognitively unable
to appreciate her former vitalist values. Prolonging her life requires a ventilator
and full ICU care. Must she endure her misery until she dies naturally, because
of her previous instruction? 57 Or can the objective standard be applied to allow
her nontreatment and death? Again, the objective standard yields the decision
most solicitous for the incompetent patient.
The moral choice is thus starkly presented: Should the competent person's
interest in exercising future control prevail over the incompetent patient's cur-
rent well-being? Of course, in many cases no conflict exists, because the living
will fails to pose a threat to the incompetent patient's significant interests. 58
55. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 636 (1986).
56. See Buchanan, supra note 37, at 301-02.
57. Conroy adopts this position: "even in the context of severe pain, life-sustaining treatment should not be
withdrawn from an incompetent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain
that he might experience." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 366-67, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
58. An example is Rhoden's paradigm living will case. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 380. The decision not
to treat an AIDS patient who has permanently lost the capacity to recognize friends and caretakers is supported
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Here I have no objection to following the will's provisions. In such cases, how-
ever, treatment decisions can also be justified without reference to the living
will. I submit that if the law is to embody genuine moral respect for the incom-
petent patient, despite that person's loss of higher level abilities, the objective
standard must control. 59 By honoring living wills, the law instead reveals a
moral preference for the interests of the competent individual. If Rhoden's view
that living wills should govern these cases becomes the law, then this normative
judgment should at least be made explicit, instead of portrayed as showing hu-
manity to incompetent patients.
IV. SHIFrING THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION - THE DRAWBACKS
Rhoden proposes that courts adopt a presumption in favor of family deci-
sionmaking. This would, she asserts, serve to acknowledge the uncertainty in-
herent in many treatment cases and to counter the modern American physi-
cian's tendency to treat patients who receive no significant benefit from such
treatment.60 She would implement this presumption by placing the burden of
initiating legal proceedings on the physician who seeks to treat an incompetent
patient against the family's wishes."1 Again, I differ with Rhoden on how best
to recognize the family's undeniable involvement in an incompetent patient's
life and death. Rather than assigning family members presumptive decision-
making authority, I would openly integrate family and other external concerns
into the substantive treatment standard. My proposal is to maintain the objec-
tive standard's initial patient-centered inquiry, but to defer to external consider-
ations when the patient lacks significant interests in receiving treatment.
Rhoden recognizes that a family's discretion to choose nontreatment must
be constrained to safeguard the incompetent patient's welfare.62 This is because
family choices may be motivated by considerations independent of the patient's
well-being. While there are probably few cases in which relatives advocate
harmful nontreatment for indisputably selfish financial or other reasons, it is
easy for emotionally and financially burdened families to confuse their own dis-
by the objective test allowing treatment to be foregone when a patient lacks significant interest in continued life.
See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
59. There is no question that giving priority to a patient's current interests would confer a burden on compe-
tent persons seeking future control. My position is that the incompetent patient's present welfare interest carries
greater moral weight than the competent individual's interest in controlling subsequent care. I do not deny that
the exercise of future-oriented autonomy is a value meriting legal recognition through property wills and con-
tracts. But I argue that the right to exercise future-oriented autonomy should be qualified by the incompetent
patient's interest in protection from harm. Thus, in the treatment setting, when such autonomy conflicts with the
incompetent patient's significant interest in continued life, the latter should take priority. Similarly, when such
autonomy conflicts with the incompetent patient's interest in avoiding severe, unremediable pain, the incompetent
patient's interest should prevail. See Buchanan, supra note 37, at 301-02 (presenting case in which paternalistic
decision to override living will might be justified); Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4,
13 (Supp. I1 1986)(acknowledging that there may be reasons to override individual's future-oriented autonomy).
60. See Rhoden, supra note I, at 420-29.
61. Id. at 440-41.
62. Id. at 440.
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tress and suffering with that of the patient.13 Thus, as Rhoden cautions, families
should not have carte blanche to decide; instead, courts should apply the (objec-
tive) reasonableness test to ensure that incompetent patients with significant in-
terests in continued life are treated.6' But instead of giving family members the
responsibility to obtain legal authority for the decisions health care professionals
oppose, Rhoden seeks to "equaliz[e] control between family and physician"65 by
shifting this responsibility to the physicians unhappy with the family's choice.
Devising workable procedures to govern treatment decisionmaking has
been an ongoing challenge for courts. Rhoden aptly describes how abusive over-
treatment can result from requiring decisionmakers to obtain judicial approval
for nontreatment. 66 Even the more streamlined procedures set forth in Conroy
create this possibility, for families and guardians may acquiesce in unwarranted
treatment to avoid incurring the emotional and financial costs entailed in the
review process.6 7 Less formal review mechanisms, such as institutional ethics
committees, offer some promise as compromises, but thus far no completely sat-
isfactory alternative has emerged.68
The challenge is to design procedures that strike an acceptable bal-
ance-demanding enough to guard against inappropriate nontreatment, yet not
so demanding as to invite unwarranted treatment. I am concerned that
Rhoden's proposal errs too much on the side of undertreatment. Although the
proposal might work well in some well-staffed private health care facilities, a
general rule giving physicians the burden of going to court fails to furnish ade-
quate safeguards to incompetent patients who would benefit from treatment.
Just as the current situation substantially burdens families, Rhoden's pro-
posal would substantially burden physicians. Many physicians could be reluc-
tant to invest the time and energy necessary to obtain court approval to treat. I
fear this would not be uncommon, especially in nursing homes where, as
Rhoden reports, "doctors seldom visit" and "curable illnesses are often neither
investigated nor treated."6 9 Rhoden suggests that hospital risk managers "will
undoubtedly advise undertaking a [court] challenge when the family's choice is
questionable. '70 I am not so sure of this. Even in the current "defensive
medicine" climate, many hospital administrators will perceive the litigation
threat as minimal when the patient's relatives, who normally would assert a
malpractice claim, are unified in advocating nontreatment.
Rhoden believes that the physician's overwhelming desire to preserve life
will also ensure that unreasonable nontreatment cases end up in court.7 1 She
63. See Meier & Cassel, Nursing Home Placement and the Demented Patient, 104 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 98, 102 (1986) (staff caring for demented patients often feel family's suffering exceeds that of patients, who
often appear content).
64. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 440-42.
65. Id. at 441.
66. See id. at 434-37.
67. See id. at 435-36 (describing Conroy's nonjudicial procedures).
68. See Brennan, Ethics Committees and Decisions to Limit Care, 260 J. AM. MED. A. 803 (1988)(describ-
ing ethics committees and their limitations).
69. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 435 n.269.
70. Id. at 441.
71. Id.
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may exaggerate the current strength and consistency of this desire, however.
The medical norms governing life-sustaining treatment are in flux, and in recent
years growing professional acceptance of nontreatment is evident. A prime illus-
tration is the American Medical Association's statement that it is ethical for
physicians to discontinue life-prolonging treatment, including medical nutrition
and hydration, from terminally ill and irreversibly comatose patients.7 2 It is now
rare for more than a few months to pass between articles in major medical
journals addressing nontreatment issues.73 Although I am sure that some physi-
cians still unreasonably oppose nontreatment, I question whether overtreatment
in opposition to a family's wishes is now as pervasive as Rhoden characterizes it.
Furthermore, I question whether Rhoden's proposed modification would
have a significant effect on improper overtreatment. As she puts it, "[o]nly as-
sertive, well-informed patients and families are likely to believe, before some
medical professional suggests it, that the choice of withholding treatment really
exists. ' 74 Similarly, their unwillingness to assume responsibility for their loved
one's death keeps many family members from raising the possibility of non-
treatment. 75 Rhoden's proposal does nothing to increase the likelihood that phy-
sicians will inform families of the nontreatment option. Greater efforts to edu-
cate physicians on the ethics and law governing treatment decisionmaking seem
a much more formidable weapon against unwarranted treatment.
Finally, I believe that a modified objective standard could more effectively
meet the legitimate interests families have in the care their incompetent rela-
tives receive. Rhoden would prefer to avoid openly including these interests as
part of the legal standard.76 But in my view, such avoidance only superficially
conceals such influences and permits them to operate subterraneously, where
they may have morally objectionable effects. 7
Treatment dilemmas involving incompetent patients unquestionably place
burdens on patients' families. Moreover, our society has an interest in devoting
its limited health care resources to people who can obtain meaningful benefits
from such care. The continued treatment of permanently unconscious and many
barely conscious patients can conflict with these familial and societal interests.
Such treatment can also violate observers' views on what constitutes dignified
72. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS 12-13 (1986).
73. See, e.g., Schneiderman & Spragg, Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation, 318
NEW EN . J. MED. 984 (1988); Loewy, Treatment Decisions in the Mentally Impaired, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1465 (1987).
74. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 439.
75. Id. at 439. Indeed, in some cases it will be the health care professionals who believe patients cannot
benefit from continued treatment, and the family members who have difficulty accepting this. See Brennan, supra
note 68, at 805 (study found increased number of such cases in recent years).
76. Id. at 402-03 n.1 14.
77. See Cantor, Conroy Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 543, 577
(1985)(survivors' interests will continue as subconscious factor shaping treatment decisions); Veatch, Limits of
Guardian Treatment Refusal: A Reasonableness Standard, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 427, 436 (1984)(burdens and
benefits of others unavoidably influence decisionmaking process). In at least two appellate cases, there is a strong
possibility that incompetent patients' significant interests were subordinated to family concerns and financial con-
siderations. See Dresser, supra note 2, at 377-79, 386 (discussing these cases).
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and respectful care for these patients.78 Legal rules ought to acknowledge and
create an express, yet limited, role for these considerations. Although the pa-
tient's own interests should take priority, the external considerations need not,
and indeed, cannot, be completely excluded from decisionmaking. An objective
treatment standard mandating treatment for incompetent patients with the ca-
pacity for meaningful interaction can protect patients, while at the same time
permitting nontreatment when patients lack the capacity to benefit from further
interventions and the interests of others would be advanced by the decision to
forego treatment.7 9
It is naive and simplistic to charge that creating an explicit role for exter-
nal considerations would inevitably expose incompetent patients to harm for the
convenience of others. It is naive to pretend that this is ruled out by other ap-
proaches. If, as Rhoden skillfully argues, the courts' nontreatment decisions
have rarely been justified by the articulated legal standards, 0 then it is quite
possible that these decisions actually were influenced by the concerns of families
and others. Rhoden's proposal for family decisionmaking also fails to guard
against the possibility of other-directed outcomes. It is simplistic as well to con-
tend that the proposal to give explicit weight to external considerations invites
abuse of patients. This response ignores the objective standard's patient-cen-
tered inquiry that must precede any deference to the concerns of others. Such
an inquiry, conducted skillfully and subject to procedural review, actually would
be the best safeguard against harmful treatment decisions motivated by social
worth and other external considerations."'
V. CONCLUSION
Instead of giving presumptive authority to living wills and family discre-
tion, the courts should adopt an objective standard to guide decisionmaking for
seriously ill incompetent patients. Decisions should rest on observers' systematic
evaluations of the patient's present capacities and experiences, because these are
the only things that now matter to this individual. Whether in the guise of a
modified best interests standard, or Rhoden's reasonableness test, the law should
mandate treatment that can provide the incompetent patient with a continued
life of meaning and value. When no such benefit is attainable, the family's
wishes or other external factors may justify nontreatment 8 2 With this legal
standard, courts can fulfill their obligation to protect vulnerable incompetent
patients from harm and also recognize the relevance of familial and societal
considerations to contemporary medical decisionmaking.
78. Rhoden properly identifies these interests as belonging to the larger society rather than to the patient.
Rhoden, supra note I, at 394-96. See also Dresser, supra note 2, at 385, 387-88.
79. As with any nontreatment standard, there remains the need to determine appropriate procedures for
implementation.
80. See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 375-77, 380-96.
81. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for a defense of quality-of-life standards.
82. This is also where the patient's wishes and values as a competent person may appropriately shape the
treatment outcome. Again, the interests of competent persons in future control merit legal recognition, but only
when they fail to endanger the incompetent patient's significant interest in continued life.
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